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

DAN SMOOT

DISARMAMENT—PART II

If the United States had an effective defense against enemy missiles, communists could not blackmail us with threats of nuclear destruction. We would not need to engage in an armaments race, or bankrupt ourselves with defense expenditures. We could maintain a small professional establishment of conventionally armed military forces — as was once American tradition — and thus defend our nation without converting it into a police state, through taxation and controls, and compulsory peacetime conscription.

But an effective anti-missile missile — *the* most desperately needed weapon in this century — is the weapon we do not have. Officialdom says American prospects of developing such a weapon are virtually non-existent — but admits that the Soviets may be on the point of developing one, if they do not already have it.[1]

Our Suicide Strategy

There is evidence that American officialdom does not *want* the United States to have an effective defense against missiles. Such evidence can be found in the State Department disarmament plan (presented to the United Nations in September, 1961) which stresses the outlawing of anti-missile weapons, and the outlawing of research and testing intended to produce such weapons.[2]

In a treatise entitled *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation,* Dr. Stefan T. Possony (of the Hoover Institute) also presented evidence that American officialdom does not want this nation to possess an adequate defense against missiles. Dr. Possony said:

"Mr. [William C.] Foster's statement . . . discloses the true attitude of the administration to antimissile defense: they just don't want it."[3]

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Foster (a member of the Council on Foreign Relations) is head of the Disarmament Agency.

In a broadcast on The Manion Forum, United States Senator Strom Thurmond said the Defense Department has already made a decision:

"To postpone the production and deployment of an anti-missile defense system until 1970 or later, if, indeed, we are ever permitted to deploy an anti-missile system."[4]

Extensive testing of nuclear weapons — especially in the atmosphere — is necessary for research to develop a defense against missiles.[3]

Yet, in the interest of negotiating with the Soviets, the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations forfeited the security interests of their own country and, for more than four years, gave the Soviets unchallenged monopoly in the field of nuclear testing.

This was done with full knowledge that there is no possibility of developing an inspection system to detect and identify "illegal" testing of nuclear weapons, even if the Soviets should agree to outlaw testing and should accept an international inspection system which *we* specified.[3]

Suppose that a "ban" on nuclear testing were in effect, with an international inspection system operating; and suppose the system detected a major high-altitude nuclear explosion somewhere above the Pacific Ocean. At best, it would take several days for the system to correlate all data and determine the exact latitude and longitude of the explosion. By the time international inspectors reached the scene, what would they find? Nothing! Submarines which fired the tests would be gone. Communist propaganda would accuse the United States of making the shot. Our officials would make denials. There would be charges and counter-charges in the United Nations. The wrangle would be protracted for weeks, while the Soviets prepared for another sneak shot somewhere over the Atlantic Ocean.

Aware of all this — and aware also of the unassailable proof that it is folly to negotiate with the Soviets at all, because treaty-breaking is a matter of policy and strategy with them[5] — Eisenhower and Kennedy, during a critical period, prohibited the nuclear testing which might have developed a defensive weapon to save this country.

The only official reason for the prohibition was that we must show "good faith" during negotiations with the Soviets!

The Eisenhower Record

On March 31, 1958, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, announced that the Soviet Union was halting all testing of nuclear weapons; and he called upon other nations, possessing such weapons, also to stop testing, in the interest of "peace and security for all peoples."[6] Why? The Soviets had just finished a series of tests; it would take them a year or more to correlate and evaluate all information thus produced; and in the interim they could not profitably do any more testing. Gromyko's announcement, in other words, was a trick designed either to stop United States nuclear testing or to give the Soviets some propaganda fodder against us if we did not stop.

Officials of the Eisenhower State Department correctly called the Soviet plea a fraud, but challenged the Soviets to approach the subject in "an orderly way," through negotiations to work out a supervised suspension of nuclear testing.[7]

For years, the communist "peace" offensive had prepared for this situation. Organizations of nuclear scientists, controlled by communist fronters; and "peace" organizations composed of preachers, teachers, and professional liberals of all kinds, had been drenching the American public with horror stories about the dangers of fall-out from nuclear testing.

Gromyko's announcement on March 31, 1958, put the "peace" organizations into high

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gear. For seven months, leftwing thunder for "banning the bomb" was deafening — until October 31, 1958, when the United States and the Soviet Union met for "test ban talks," and agreed to suspend all testing of nuclear weapons, without inspections, while the talks continued. Eisenhower ordered a halt to United States testing, accepting Khrushchev's unsupported promise that he would do likewise.[8]

Week after week, month after month, year after year, the "test ban talks" continued, fruitlessly. The Soviets, busy assimilating information already produced by tests, did not need to make any nuclear shots in the atmosphere; but — as the whole world was aware — they went right ahead with underground shots and any other testing they pleased, ignoring their agreement to halt all tests for the duration of the negotiations.

Eisenhower kept the agreement, however, permitting no more American testing during the remainder of his administration.

Dreary communiques from Geneva about another non-productive session of the "test ban talks" often seemed timed, with sardonic humor, to coincide with other events which underscored the absurdity of the talks. For example, on August 3, 1959, a report from Geneva revealed that the 118th "test ban" meeting between representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain was deadlocked. On that same day, the White House announced that Eisenhower had agreed to a personal exchange of visits with Khrushchev.[9]

Khrushchev was in the United States on September 17, 1959, when Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, spoke to the UN General Assembly urging total disarmament in three stages:

(1) an international agreement fixing a date for disarmament and size and quality of national forces that would be left after disarmament, and deciding on the quantity and kind of weapons for an international army; (2) progressive steps in disarming nations and in arming the international army; (3) final national disarmament, with rearming outlawed, and a fully established international army to enforce the peace, control national military budgets, space exploration, and so on.[10]

Selwyn Lloyd demanded "effective inspection to insure compliance" at every stage in the plan; yet he proposed that inspection control would be established *after disarmament.* So, in effect, Selwyn Lloyd recommended *total disarmament without inspection.*[10]

The next day — September 18, 1959 — Khruschev also spoke to the UN General Assembly, and recommended *total disarmament without inspection.*[11]

One month later — October 18, 1959 — Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (and member of the Council on Foreign Relations), speaking to the Greater Miami Association for the United Nations, said that the problem of determining which should come first, *disarmament* or *controls,* is as baffling as the old riddle about which came first, the *chicken* or the *egg.*[12]

On March 15, 1960, five Western powers and five Soviet bloc powers met at Geneva for general disarmament talks. These were in addition to the "nuclear test ban talks" which had been going on at Geneva since October, 1958.[13]

On May 12, 1960, United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut) made a speech to the United States Senate saying:

"Before it is too late, we must call off the [nuclear test] ban. At stake is the preservation of peace and the survival of our nation and of freedom on this earth. Our guileless approach to the moratorium places us in mortal peril, for it rests on blind trust in the honesty of the Kremlin, a dictatorship with a shocking record of violations of its pledges.

"Some American experts are convinced that the Soviets are already testing secretly. No one can seriously doubt that they will do so whenever it suits them."[14]

In June, 1960, the Soviets walked out of

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the Geneva "test ban talks," and stayed away for several months.[13]

On September 22, 1960, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower gently reproved the Soviets for not entering into disarmament agreements, and rebuked them for walking out of the "test ban talks," pleading with them to come back for more.[13]

Eisenhower's plea set the stage for the Soviets who, the next day (September 23, 1960), presented to the United Nations their plan for total, world-wide disarmament (the same plan which Khrushchev had presented to the UN a year before).[13]

The Kennedy Record

Kennedy, inaugurated President in 1961, continued the ban on American nuclear testing; and he appointed Paul Nitze to be Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Walt W. Rostow to be Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It later became known that these two high officials of the Kennedy Administration (together with others from the Council on Foreign Relations, whose members occupy key positions in the Kennedy Administration) had lectured, almost a year before, to a National Strategy Seminar at Asilomar Conference Grounds on the Monterey Peninsula, in California.

The general argument of lectures which Rostow and Nitze, and the others, gave at the Strategy Seminar was that the United States cannot win a nuclear war; that continued attempts to produce nuclear superiority will spur the Soviets to do likewise and thus increase the danger of a holocaust; that we should, therefore, de-emphasize nuclear weapons on the theory that the Soviets will follow our lead; that we should build up our conventional military power in order to increase our capacity to fight in limited wars; and that we should work toward some form of world government strong enough to eliminate wars altogether.[15]

Paul Nitze told the Strategy Seminar that the United States should begin disarmament without requiring disarmament of other nations, in the hope that our action would "produce reciprocal action on the part of our allies and also on the part of our enemies."

Nitze said we should stop all efforts to build a Class A nuclear capability, which could strike first or take offensive action: and that we should build *purely retaliatory* defense systems, and then surrender command of those systems to international authority. He proposed that we make this surrender by giving NATO command of our Strategic Air Command, and by notifying the United Nations that NATO will turn over to the UN the ultimate power of decision on the use of American retaliatory systems.[15]

After Nitze became Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the public found out what his real "defense policy" is, alarmed citizens wrote Washington officialdom demanding explanation. Official explanations from Washington included:

(1) flat denials that Nitze had ever made such a proposal; (2) assertions that Nitze did not really mean that he wanted SAC to be made a NATO command; (3) explanations that in making such a proposal, Nitze was really suggesting that such a thing should *not* be done — that he was merely throwing it out as a "grand fallacy"; (4) explanations that Nitze's proposal had no official standing, because Nitze was not a member of the Administration when the proposal was made.

Dr. Lawrence G. Osborne, Santa Barbara, California, got replies from *two* Washington officials: one from Timothy W. Stanley (Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) saying that a proposal to turn SAC over to NATO was *not* under consideration by the Kennedy Administration; another from Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, saying:

"The proposal that the Strategic Air Command be placed under the over-all administration and command of NATO is one which is being given a great deal of thought and deliberation."

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On March 23, 1961, a "briefing" session on disarmament was held at the State Department. About 75 persons attended, representing such organizations as the United World Federalists, Americans for Democratic Action, Women's International League for Peace, American Association for the United Nations, Federation of American Scientists, Twentieth Century Fund, UAW-CIO, and the General Federation of Women's Groups.

Mr. E. A. Gullion, Deputy Director of the Disarmament Administration (and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations) presided. He urged the groups to propagandize for the establishment of a permanent Disarmament Agency under the control of the State Department, and not answerable to Congress. An agency free of congressional controls would have more latitude for doing what it felt necessary in the field of disarmament, Mr. Gullion explained, pointing out that it is "difficult to work under the 18th century Constitution."

On March 28, 1961, President Kennedy sent to Congress a defense message modeled on a confidential memorandum submitted to him by his Deputy Assistant, Walt W. Rostow, who had had a private meeting in Moscow with Vasily V. Kuznetsov. Rostow told President Kennedy that the Soviets do not think Americans really want disarmament, because we continue to build a "first-strike" capability against the Soviet Union. Rostow recommended that we allay Soviet suspicions by *de-emphasizing* offensive weapons and by *emphasizing* defensive weapons.

On March 30, 1961, the *Chicago Sun-Times* published a story headlined: *Inside Story Of A Big Switch: Kennedy's Defense Strategy Tailored To Ease Red Fears.* The story was written in Washington by Thomas B. Ross, who commented on the relationship between Kennedy's defense program and the Rostow memorandum, saying:

"The similarities in the statements of Rostow and Mr. Kennedy were no coincidence. It is known that large sections of the President's defense message were written explicitly for the consumption of top Russian officials.

"Moreover, on the recommendation of Charles E. Bohlen, the State Department's leading expert on Russia, certain communist phraseology was inserted in the message. . . .

"That much of the defense message was directed to the Soviet leaders is evident in the fact that Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Ambassador to Russia, was given a special briefing on it. . . . The message will now be forwarded to him in Moscow so he can reassure Soviet officials that the United States is taking care not to produce a 'first-strike capability.'

"Emphasis on a 'second-strike' capability ran through all the White House meetings on the message. Most of the sessions were directed by Mr. Kennedy's chief aide, Theodore Sorensen, who repeatedly made it clear that the President wanted to avoid provocative, offensive weapons."

Charles Bohlen, who recommended "communist phraseology" in Kennedy's defense message, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Another key figure in Kennedy's defense-disarmament planning is Dr. Jerome Bert Wiesner, also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Here is information about Wiesner, from *The New York Times Magazine*:

"Dr. Jerome Bert Wiesner, a former professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. . . . is the top planner, arbitrator and counselor of scientific policy within the Government, and, thus, throughout the scientific community at large. . . . Wiesner oversees the operations of all scientifically oriented agencies, such as the Defense Department, Atomic Energy Commission and National Science Foundation. . . .

"[He] operates behind a wall of White House secrecy, somewhat to the dismay of Congress which would like to be privy to his scientific policy advice. . . .

"Before joining the Administration, Wiesner made no secret of his belief that the United States at times had been almost as much to blame as the Soviet Union for blocking agreement on arms-control measures. . . .

"One of the principal obstacles standing in the way of disarmament, in Wiesner's opinion, is a 'communications block' between the two sides. . . .

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"It was largely because of his desire to break down the 'communications block' that Wiesner last fall took the potentially impolitic step of going to Moscow to attend a non-governmental conference of East-West scientists on disarmament."[16]

On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy, in a special message to Congress, asked for establishment of a disarmament agency.[17] This was the first formal step toward the agency which the March 23, 1961, State Department "briefing" of leftwing leaders had prepared the propaganda campaign for.

On June 23, 1961, John J. McCloy, Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament (and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations), sent to the President a draft of a bill to create the new agency. In his letter of transmittal to the President, McCloy revealed that the fundamental purpose of the Disarmament Agency is to work for world government.[17]

On June 29, 1961, President Kennedy sent McCloy's proposed Bill to the Congress. In his letter of transmittal, the President also revealed that the purpose of the Bill was not only to work toward elimination of national armaments, but to "strengthen international institutions" into world government.[17]

On August 15, 1961, four former high officials in the Eisenhower Administration — Christian A. Herter, Thomas S. Gates, General Alfred M. Gruenther, and Henry Cabot Lodge (all members of the Council on Foreign Relations) — testified before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee in support of President Kennedy's Disarmament Agency. Lodge urged that the Western powers also set up a "unified diplomatic command" so that our "decision-making machinery" will not be cumbersome.[18]

Former President Eisenhower wrote a letter strongly endorsing the proposed agency.[18]

On August 30, 1961, the Soviet Union abruptly announced that it would resume massive testing of nuclear weapons.[17] The moratorium which the Soviets had asked for in 1958 was at last to end: they had completed their analyses of the 1958 tests and were ready for another series.

One interesting aspect of the Soviet announcement is that it came on the eve of a meeting of 24 "neutral" nations at Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Ostensibly, a major purpose of the meeting was to underscore the neutral nations' oft-repeated plea for major powers to stop testing nuclear weapons. The oddly-timed Soviet announcement looked like a deliberate affront. The liberal press of America predicted that this arrogant act would outrage the neutralist leaders gathering at Belgrade and would, thus, backfire on the Soviets.

But when the neutralist leaders gathered, they expressed sympathy for the Soviet Union, and blamed the United States for causing the Soviets to resume nuclear testing.[19]

The 24 neutral nations, whose leaders took this action, had all received (and are still receiving) great quantities of aid from the United States, little or nothing from the Soviet Union.[19]

The announced Soviet plan to resume nuclear testing did not slow down the American drive for disarmament. On September 23, 1961, the House of Representatives authorized a final version of The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (HR 9118, Public Law 87-297), to establish an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Just as E. A. Gullion had demanded at the State Department briefing six months before, the Agency was set up free of congressional controls.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 confers upon the Director of the new Disarmament Agency broad authority (under the general supervision of the President and the Secretary of State) to do just about anything the Director may claim to be in the interest of peace and arms control. The Director can formulate United States disarmament policies, conduct negotiations with foreign powers and international organizations, com-

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mand the services of other federal agencies, obtain restricted information from the Atomic Energy Commission—and enjoy specific exemptions from laws written by Congress. For example, Section 43 of Title IV of the Act says:

"The President may, in advance, exempt actions of the Director from the provisions of law relating to contracts or expenditures of Government funds whenever he determines that such action is essential in the interest of United States arms control and disarmament and security policy."

Only in Section 33 of Title III of Public Law 87-297 did Congress insert a provision indicating an intent to retain, *in Congress,* some control over policies and programs devised by the Director of the Disarmament Agency. A clause in Section 33 provides:

"That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution, or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."

This provision is meaningless, because modern (and *incorrect*) Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution hold that the "treaty making power of the President" includes the power to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations — without the advice and consent, or even the knowledge, of the United States Senate.[20]

On September 25, 1961—two days after the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 was passed in the House — Adlai Stevenson presented, to the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations, the American plan for total world-wide disarmament. This American plan (almost identical with the plan which the Soviet Union had submitted to the UN on September 23, 1960)[21] would transfer control of United States nuclear weapons to the United Nations, restrict the American military esablishment to the size and kind needed for control of the American population, and prohibit us from possessing or even trying to develop a *defense* against weapons of mass destruction.[2,21]

Senator Strom Thurmond (Democrat, South Carolina) made several speeches in the latter part of 1961, sharply criticizing the State Department plan to surrender American nuclear weapons to the UN. Although the plan had been formally presented to the UN and the text published in an official State Department pamphlet, Washington officials, when receiving inquiries from the public, flatly denied that the plan existed. Here are passages from a typical official letter of denial — this one written by John E. Carland, Director of Special Activities, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Mrs. W. M. Walters in Spokane, Washington:

"This is in reference to your recent communication relative to reports that the United States is considering turning over nuclear weapons or information about such weapons to the United Nations.

"The Department of Defense has received other similar letters, apparently stemming from erroneous articles that have appeared in some newspapers. The Defense Department has no such plans and we know of no government proposal which would involve turning nuclear weapons or information about them over to the United Nations."

By the end of 1961, plans for disarming the United States (and, thus, surrendering her sovereignty) were formulated and announced. In 1962, as will be shown in this *Report* next week, came further development of the plans — chiefly in the form of *concessions* to entice Soviet agreement.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Article by Fred Farris, New York Herald Tribune News Service, dateline Washington, in *The San Francisco Examiner,* March 12, 1962

(2) The American plan for total disarmament was published in September, 1961, by the Government Printing Office as State Department Publication 7277, entitled *Freedom From War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.* Here are passages from the official text:

"The Nations of the world. . . . set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament . . .

"The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order; . . .

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"As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened. . . .

"STAGE I. . . .

"An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. . . .

"Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels. . . . The reduction shall be accomplished . . . by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO. . . .

"Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

"Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted. . . .

"STAGE II. . . .

"Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out. . . .

"During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. . . . The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened. . . .

"STAGE III. . . .

"In Stage III, progressive controlled disarmament . . . would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force. . . .

"States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

"The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

"The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. . . ."

(3) *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation*, by Stefan T. Possony, *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1963 pp. 4358-70

(4) "Are We Trying To Lose The Cold War?" by U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond (Democrat, South Carolina), Weekly Broadcast No. 447, The Manion Forum, South Bend, Indiana, April 21, 1963

(5) *Soviet Political Agreements and Results*, a Staff Study, Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, May 21, 1956

(6) "Text of Gromyko Announcement of the Soviet Decision to Suspend Nuclear Tests," Reuters dispatch from London, *The New York Times*, April 1, 1958, pp. 14-15

(7) "U.S. Statement on the Soviet Decision," AP dispatch from Washington, *The New York Times*, April 1, 1958, p. 15

(8) Special to the Times, *The New York Times*, October 31, 1958, p. 1; and Special to the Times from Geneva by Drew Middleton, *The New York Times*, November 1, 1958, pp. 1, 3

(9) "Khrushchev Coming to U.S. Next Month," Special to the Times from Washington by Felix Belair, Jr., *The New York Times*, August 4, 1959, pp. 1, 3; and "Nuclear Talks Proceed: 3 Powers Reiterate Stands on Controls in Geneva," Special to the Times from Geneva, *The New York Times*, August 4, 1959, p. 3

(10) "Lloyd Remarks," Special to the Times from the UN, *The New York Times*, September 18, 1959, pp. 4-5

(11) "Text of Premier Khrushchev's Address to the United Nations General Assembly," and "Text of Soviet Government Declaration Proposing Complete Disarmament," *The New York Times*, September 19, 1959, pp. 8-9, 12

(12) "U.S. Said Willing To Equal Soviet Disarmament Steps," UPI dispatch from Miami Beach, *Durham (North Carolina) Morning Herald*, October 19, 1959

(13) *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, State Department Publication No. 7172, July, 1961, pp. xii, 66, 131, 225-9, 229-48

(14) "The Summit and the Test Ban Fallacy," speech by U.S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), *Congressional Record*, May 12, 1960, pp. 9412-23

(15) *Proceedings of the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar*, prepared by Stanford Research Institute, sponsored by Sixth U.S. Army, Western Sea Frontier, Fourth Air Force, April, 1960; and "Idea Promoted: Defeatism Big Danger," by Edith Kermit Roosevelt, *The Dallas Morning News*, September 17, 1961

(16) "Top Scientist On The New Frontier," by John W. Finney, *The New York Times Magazine*, September 3, 1961, pp. 8 ff.

(17) *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 5, August, 1962, pp. 151-61, 196-9, 214-27, 317-50

(18) Letter, U.S. Representative Walter Rogers (Democrat, Texas) in support of Disarmament Agency, February 2, 1963

(19) "Text of the Declaration of Belgrade," *The New York Times*, September 7, 1961, p. 8; "When 'Neutrals' get Together," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 11, 1961, pp. 74 ff.

(20) Discussion of the Executive Agreement and its binding powers, various Supreme Court decisions, contained in *The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation*, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Edward S. Corwin, Editor, U.S. Senate Document No. 170, 82d Congress, 2d Session, 1953, pp. 434-45

(21) "This Time, Russians Really Did It First," *Amarillo (Texas) Daily News*, February 16, 1963, p. 4 — setting out, side by side, the Soviet disarmament proposals of September 23, 1960; and the American disarmament proposals of September 25, 1961

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WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU in Dallas, getting BA and MA degrees in 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American Civilization.

In 1942, he left Harvard and joined the FBI. As an FBI Agent, he worked for three and a half years on communist investigations in the industrial Midwest; two years as an administrative assistant to J. Edgar Hoover on FBI headquarters staff in Washington; and almost four years on general FBI cases in various parts of the nation.

In 1951, Smoot resigned from the FBI and helped start Facts Forum. On Facts Forum radio and television programs, Smoot spoke to a national audience, giving *both sides* of controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his present independent publishing and broadcasting business — a free-enterprise operation financed entirely by profits from sales: sales of *The Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly magazine; and sales of a weekly news-analysis broadcast, to business firms, for use on radio and television as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and the broadcast give only *one* side in presenting documented truth about important issues — the side that uses the American Constitution as a yardstick. The *Report* is available by subscription; and the broadcasts are available for commercial sponsorship, anywhere in the United States.

If you think Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for Americans fighting socialism and communism, you can help immensely — by helping him get more customers for his *Report* and broadcasts.

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